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Introduction
Accounts of the problems involved in applying human factors within industry have a long history and date back to some of the earliest examples of research and practice within human factors and ergonomics (Meister, 1999; Chapanis, 1999; Waterson and Sell, 2006) . Over the years a number of authors have pointed to a range of problems and barriers that underpin the relationship between human factors practitioners and their industrial counterparts. In particular, the work of David Meister and colleagues during the 1960's, 70's and 80's has addressed these issues in depth. Meister and Farr (1967) for example, found that designers and engineers had little or no interest in human factors, partly since human factors information was perceived as being too inaccessible as compared to charts, graphs and tables. Later work during the 1970s and early 1980s (Meister 1982a,b) sought out the views of engineers, research contractors and government personnel regarding human factors. One of the main conclusions from this research that individuals were not convinced of the value of human factors and were inadequately trained in the use of HF tools and methods.
In his analysis of the influence of organisational context on the work of human factors engineers (HFEs), Charles Perrow (1983) argued that the relative weak position and low profile of the HFE within the context of the larger organisation in which they are employed, served to undermine the value and impact of their work. Various other explanations for this type of phenomenon can be given, including the differences in terms of "mindsets" and values which exist between HFEs and colleagues drawn from other disciplines and backgrounds (e.g., social science as compared to engineering - Cullen, 2007) . In addition, many have pointed to the high costs of inputs from human factors into the design process and HF assessments and evaluations (Beevis, 2003; Kerr et al., 2008 ).
Human Factors Integration (HFI)
In the last few years the drive toward improving the uptake of human factors within industry has led to the development of initiatives to support human factors integration (HFI). Newman and Tatlock (2004) report the outcomes of a workshop held with HFI practitioners from industry in order to ascertain the types of barriers that exist when applying HFI within system design. The workshop generated over 190 recommendations and covered a range of issues including the provision of "help desk" facilities to help manage the HFI process, the need for better structured tools and methods for the identification of HFI issues and methods for quantifying the costs and benefits of HFI. Similarly, the report highlighted the importance of organisational factors such as culture and attitudes amongst system designers in shaping the outcomes of HFI initiatives.
Much of the research that has been carried out on HFI has focused on the development of method and tool development (Newman et al., 2008; MacLeod, 2008) . Similarly, others have focused on the need to develop cogent arguments for cost justification of HFI (Bruseberg, 2008) . Little recent work has concentrated in detail on the social and organisational "process issues", namely: the day-to-day work of HF teams; their interaction with other groups; communication problems and barriers; and, the influence of large-scale extrinsic factors such as organisational culture.
In the next section of the paper we describe the framework for understanding the social and organisational aspects of HFI. The framework brings together previous research on the organisational constraints on HFI (e.g., Perrow, 1983) , as well as other research which has examined the components of effective team working within organisations (e.g., Antoni and Hertel, 2009; Sundstrom, DeMeuse and Futrell, 1990 ).
The framework was partly used to design an interview schedule that was used with a case study of the social and organisational aspects of HFI (sections 3 and 4). In the discussion section of the paper (section 5) we use the framework to shed further light on the findings from the case study, as well as considering the wider implications of these findings for future research on HFI.
A framework for understanding the social and organisational aspects of HFI
The work of human factors teams within organisations can be seen as being influenced by a range of factors which cut across organisational, team and individual levels of analysis. At the wider organisational level, reward systems, the structural characteristics of the organisation and it's cultural values will play a role in how they operate (Schein, 2005) . We know from previous work on HFI for example, that the work of the HF team is often marginalised and their role in the business of the organisation may be seen as unimportant or peripheral (Perrow, 1983) .
The effectiveness with which they function as a team within the organisation is sometimes seen as consisting of two main dimensions: team performance and team viability (Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom, DeMeuse and Futrell, 1990) . Team performance refers to the degree to which the work team meets standards given by supervisors or customers within or outside the wider organisation. In the context of a HF team this might mean the degree to which the team is seen as providing support to the design process or supporting the large business goals within the organisation.
Team viability refers to extent that collaboration between members of the team an other groups within the organisation is sustained over time. In this case, this might refer to how likely the involvement of the HF team in projects is likely to extend beyond short-term project work and progress into longer-term collaborations within the organisation. Finally, at an individual level of analysis attitudes and mindsets regarding the value of HF and its role in the design progress are likely to shape the way in which the HF team work within the organisation (Meister 1982 a, b) . The framework is used in part to probe deeper into the social and organisational aspects of HFI using a case study of a human factors team working within an industrial, defence-based context. Specifically, the aims of the paper are threefold:
• To examine in detail an industrial case study of the social and organisational processes that shape the work of a human factors team and their relationship with colleagues from other disciplines;
• To describe the main barriers, problems and enables of the work of the human factors team and compare this with previous research on HFI.
• To interpret the findings from the case study in terms of the social and organisational aspects of HFI framework described earlier.
Method

Setting and team characteristics
The study took place within a division of a large engineering company based within the UK. The main business of the company division is taken up with defence applications and the application of human factors design assessment and evaluation techniques. The human factors team work in close partnership with contractors from the defence industry, as well as engineers and other personnel responsible for safety employed by the company. The team is comprised of approximately 8 members and is well established within the company, having been in existence for over ten or so years. Membership of the team is relatively stable and their role in the company is clearly defined in terms of operational procedures. The activities of the human factors team corresponds to the definition of a "work team" as described by Cohen and Bailey (1987) , in that they are charged with performing tasks associated with the core activities of the company (e.g., evaluating the safety of defence equipment and putting forward suggestions for improvements to design). The work of team often involves a small number of the 8 members working on project work. In other cases the team may be tasked as a whole to work on longer-term project work. Due to the confidential nature of the work conducted by the team we have disguised references to specific projects, as well as other details of their work which would have compromised their anonymity. Leader and subsequently contacted by one of the researchers by email in order to arrange dates and times for interview. A purposive sampling strategy was used in order to ensure that a representative sample of company roles (e.g., managers and team leaders) and disciplines took part in the study (e.g., human factors team members, design engineers). The interviews lasted between 30 minutes to 1 hour. In addition, a number of participants were later contacted by email in order to clarify material derived from the interview, as well as to give them the opportunity for further comments.
Participants and recruitment
Interview schedule
A semi-structured interview schedule was drawn up and based upon the findings from previous research examining the barriers and enablers to successful human factors integration. In this context we define a barrier as an "obstacle or agency that prevents the integration of HF into project work". The term enabler, by contrast we take to refer to "something that eases or supplies the means to bring about the integration of 
Data Analysis
All of the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and manually transcribed into Microsoft Word documents. The data was then inputted into the NVivo (version 7) qualitative data analysis software package. Template analysis (King, 1998; Crabtree and Miller, 1999) was used to further examine and develop codes using a set of a priori codes based upon data within the headings and sub-heading in the interview schedule. Once the a priori codes had been defined they were subsequently applied to the whole dataset. During the second phase of data analysis the original codes were reanalysed and a number of additional themes and sub-themes emerged from the data. This process followed the guidelines outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) and resulted in a final coding scheme (table 2) . Table 2 here
Results
The work and role of the human factors team
Much of the work of the human factors team is mandatory, in the sense that projects are required to have human factors input due to legal and safety considerations:
"There is a split in our human factors integration … You must have human factors input, which is good because obviously everybody in the project knows that human factors integration must happen" (Human Factors Team Member)
In other cases there is a degree of flexibility, whereby the team, may be called into projects on an informal basis and their opinion sought on a variety of issues relating to human factors:
"It could be anything from a couple of hours to attend a meeting to providing human factors or specialist expertise, right the way through to a year to two-year project … (Human Factors Team Leader)
A distinction can be drawn between examples of the work of the team where they have been "pulled" into projects through an external request and other instances where the team actively "pushes" themselves into projects. Frequent examples of the "pull" aspects of the work of the team involve information provision, often in the form of anthropometric, human reliability and other forms of HF data:
"Within our organisation the human factors team are kind of data suppliers to our safety work. We carry out a risk model which obviously has questions based on the user. We ask for the information from the human factors team, which is generally human reliability assessment data" (Safety Engineer)
The team also actively attempts to "push" HF into design and raise the awareness of other project members of the need to consider HF when carrying out design activities: Establishing a rapport with other disciplines outside of HF and building on this during project work, involved a variety of actions on the part of the human factors team.
These included being proactive, supportive and maintaining a positive attitude toward working in multidisciplinary teams:
"One of the biggest things that I've learnt about human factors integration here is that you have to work with other disciplines, work effectively with other disciplines for the human factors integration part … build up on that rapport and the movement of information, being clear on what the software engineer or the hardware engineer are trying to achieve." (Human factors Team Member)
In some cases it might also mean trying to understand the needs of other colleagues and adopting their point of view:
"It is basically important to understand the context of the project and try to go on from there and be quite proactive. If you show enthusiasm and pump a few more ideas into the process … they will be quite forthcoming with you. It's also about building a rapport as well" (Human Factors Team Member)
Maintaining the relationship also required persistence and determination:
"I've seen some thorough hard work by the human factors people over the years and they demonstrate and provide valuable input, but it's not necessarily a natural joining together of the technical people and the actual human factors people. It has to continually be propagated by the human factors side" (Safety Engineer).
The friendliness of the team and approachability was singled out as reasons underpinning successful relationships and helped to cement these together:
"The human factors team are very, very friendly people and easy to know. I think people like [name] must have the patience of a saint to have the courage to run human factors and handle the criticisms and grief from the other side." (Safety Engineer)
The approachability of the team acted as a way of opening up channels of communication:
"The HF people are very open approachable lot, they were forthcoming with the answers and there's a lot of two way communication." (Design Engineer)
Learning
One of the processes that has led to greater integration of HF within engineering projects has been through mutual learning. Human factors team members and colleagues from other disciplines have learnt to appreciate and value their different roles and viewpoints on design issues:
"I think it was basically a learning process from both sides, the design engineer's understanding what the human factors people had to do, and likewise the human factors people understanding what the designers had to do." (Development Engineer)
Part of this mutual learning has involved appreciation of the differences that exist between the goals and viewpoints of human factors team members and other disciplines:
"There's a mixed aspect to the relationship, I think its positive in that human factors drives towards having a better design, and I think the negativity comes from where human factors obviously wants to do a full job when they look at things. They want to be quite thorough, whereas the management of the design team probably want to get a maximum return of what they can get but in a small space of time and money so they aren't using too much budget." (Design Engineer) "I think it's quite a good attitude now, there's none of this 'here we go human factors is now coming in to stop us'. I also think that as a designer, we might not always appreciate the environment that the operator works in, so human factors can be our saviour at times." (Design Engineer)
Communication and mutual understanding
Communication and problems of communication were mentioned by respondents as factors that determined the success of HF integration within the company. In some cases, respondents pointed to difficulties in understanding as a barrier to integration:
"They absolutely need to understand what engineers are talking about, so that they do need the basic man-machine interface training and a basic engineering understanding of how things work, because you just can't get on at all otherwise". (Safety Engineer)
Respondents sometimes referred to styles and modes of communication as ways of improving integration:
"They should have a welcoming disposition towards them, as they have some valuable ideas to provide" (Domain Engineer)
In some cases the ability of an individual to put over a point of view, particularly with managers was seen as advantageous:
"it's good communication with the people that manage the project, and amongst different teams that were taking part in the project, and then really after that it often comes down to individuals as to how well it flows" (HF Subcontractor Safety
Engineer)
The problems involved in the nature of HF data, finding the right level of detail, as well as the difficulties in providing an unequivocal opinion relating to HF data were also mentioned as sometimes leading to communication problems
"What you do find is that at a level of detail you get a lot of conflicting advice between various human factors experts, not even that, [it's] more the priority or importance of an aspect." (Safety Engineer)
Presenting data in a particular format was seen as facilitating translation across The view that human factors was "common sense" was mentioned by a number of respondents as a significant barrier in establishing HF within projects:
"Sometimes you don't feel valued because you are seen as common sense or an add on and some people are not open-minded enough to see that you can add value to their project." (Human Factors Team Leader)
In other cases, even where there was established support and enthusiasm for the work of the HF team, the view that HF was "just common sense" was still present amongst those outside of the team:
"We used a human factors approach, using our expert to say, come on this is common sense, and in some respects this is the problem with human factors isn't it? A lot of it is common sense, and a lot of that is quite clever in the design analysis technique. But some of it is common sense" (Head of Engineering)
Another attitude that seemed to be common was that HF was a "tick box" activity, which should be carried out quickly and with a minimal of disruption: 
Costs and resources
The perception that HF was costly and time consuming was mentioned by respondents a number of times:
"When the organisation tries to avoid using human factors [it] is usually on cost and time scales, sometimes it's sort of internally; we get we get very detailed human factors assessments of work and sometimes that is seen as going over the top for what we need." (Development Engineer) "I suppose in terms of cost cutting it might be seen as a soft add on." (Safety Team Leader)
Other resource issues, including time, the size and turnover within the team were also seen as having an impact upon integration activities: 
Discussion
The findings from the interviews with HF and other personnel within the company could be said to be typical of the types of problems we might have expected to be find amongst HF practitioners working within an industrial or commercial context.
Comparing our results with previous work carried out on the barriers that exist to HFI demonstrates that many attitudes and perceptions (e.g., that HF is "common sense"
and costly) are as prevalent today as they were twenty-five years ago (Meister, 1982a, b; Perrow, 1983 The improvement strategies employed by the HF team in many cases involved them actively trying to break through barriers with other groups. In a number of cases this meant actively trying to adopt the perspective or tap into the "mindset" of engineering groups within the company. In other cases it meant modifying the way in which they presented, or "translated", data to these groups by presenting it in different formats (e.g., presenting quantitative data in a pictorial format). Many of the strategies involved improvements to communications between the groups, as well as actively championing and promoting the value of HF.
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The attempts by the HF team to improve HFI in the company share similarities with other research on the behaviour of newly introduced or minority groups within organisations. Ancona and Caldwell (1990) for example, found that faced with the challenge of raising their profile within a large organisation, new product development teams engaged in a number of boundary management activities. These included setting up roles such as "team ambassador" (e.g., representing the team to other groups, "talking the team up" in order to obtain outside resources) and "team coordinator" (e.g., communicating laterally with other groups, discussing problems with them and gaining feedback on team progress). Within the HF team these types of roles
were not set up in such a formal manner, however, they could serve as the basis from which to consider further improvements to HFI within the company.
Implications and lessons for HFI
The study sheds light on an area of investigation that has involved a great deal of discussion and debate over the last few years. Much of this discussion has been driven by methods and tools to narrow the gap between HF personnel and their system development counterparts. The case study we have described provides some further insights into the "softer", more process-oriented aspects of HFI and shows that there are a range of social and organisational strategies that similar HF teams can adopt when attempting to establish better and more productive working relationships with groups from other disciplines. The framework in particular, might serve as a basis with which to plan and evaluate team-based improvement strategies. It could be used for example, to structure discussions centred around gaps in skills and knowledge and other consider options for internal changes to the working of the HF team. Many of the improvement strategies, alongside lessons learnt from other contexts involving boundary management between organisational groups (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1990) , might provide other HF teams in similar settings with ideas and interventions designed to improve HFI.
Limitations and future work
The small sample size of our study may well limit the extent to which it generalises to other HFI contexts. Similarly, we examined HFI as it applies within the context of the defence industry, a domain in which HFI shares many similarities with other domains, but most likely operates in a different manner. Nevertheless, the fact that our findings chime with those obtained in both the defence and other types of industries leads us to have some confidence in their ability to generalise. Future work need to be carried out in order to evaluate the framework and to explore further types of barriers and improvement strategies that may play a more important role in other contexts.
Another line of research that could be explored is tracking the development of changes to attitudes and perceptions, alongside social and organisational developments over a longer period of time. This types of research has yielded important insights within other types of industrial contexts and projects (e.g., software
engineering - Walz et al., 1993; Waterson et al., 1997) . In our future work we plan to add in a later data collection phase to the study and compare our findings with those described in the present study in order to see how the process of HFI develops over time. 
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